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Abstract
We introduce an interactive market setup with sequential auctions
where agents receive variegated signals with a known deadline. The
effects of differential information and mutual learning on the alloca-
tion of overall profit & loss (P&L) and the pace of price discovery are
analysed. We characterise the signal-based expected P&L of agents
based on explicit formulae for the directional quality of the trading
signal, and study the optimal trading pattern using dynamic program-
ming and provided that there is a common anticipation by agents of
gains from trade. We find evidence in favour of exploiting new in-
formation whenever it arrives, and market efficiency. Brief extensions
of the problem to risk-adjusted gains as well as risk-averse agents are
provided. We then introduce the ‘information-adjusted risk premium’
and recover the signal-based equilibrium price as the weighted average
of the signal-based individual prices with respect to the risk-aversion
levels.
Keywords: Information flow, signal-based pricing, random bridge
processes, mutual learning, asymmetric information, optimal trading
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1 Introduction
The raison d’eˆtre of the markets we study is, in fact, to support information-
based trading. Trade can occur on purely informational causes. In [6], for
example, we are shown that there are situations in which both parties are
strictly better off under a trade executed solely on the basis of their individ-
ual information. This is somewhat contrary to, e.g., [16] and [21]. Indeed,
∗I am grateful to Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber and Edward Hoyle for their comments, and
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one can be overwhelmed by the task of handling a very broad spectrum
of aspects where agent-level heterogeneity can arise, such as risk aversion
levels, degrees of rationality, patience, beliefs, and information gathering,
processing skills, and so on. A detailed classification of different market mi-
crostructure models, on the other hand, is given in [10] and beyond the scope
of this study. However, we start with a review of the selected literature.
Perhaps one of the earliest sequential (discrete) trade models is the one
described in the work of Glosten and Milgrom (cf. [15]), where an attempt
is made to explain bid-ask spread as a purely informational phenomenon
that is believed to be arising from adverse selection behaviour encountered
by less-informed traders. The informational properties of transaction prices
and the reaction of the spread to market-generated as well as other public
information is also investigated. One of the interesting implications of this
model is the possibility of market shutdowns due to severe informational
inefficiencies. This is similar to the “lemons problem” of Akerlof [2]. The
informational content of prices and the value of extra information to the
holder are also examined in the work of Kyle (cf. [19]) through sequential
as well as continuous auction models. Moreover, the latter two seem to
converge as the trading interval gets smaller. One interesting result of the
model discussed in [19], and to a certain extent in [15], is that modelling
innovations as functions of quantities traded is found to be consistent with
modelling price innovations as the consequence of new information arrivals.
The ‘informativeness of prices’ (which is complementary to the amount of
information which is yet to be incorporated into prices) in the context of
[19] refers to the error variance of future dividend given the market clearing
price. The question is how intensively the agent, given his superior signal,
should trade over time to maximise his profit given his actions might disturb
the market (i.e., prices and depth). This model is later on extended in [3] to
general continuous distributions for the dividend. Then, a modified version
of [15] in continuous time, where ‘bluffing’ (i.e., mixed strategy) is also
allowed, is shown to converge to, again, a modified version of [19] with a
random signal deadline in [4]. A rather game-theoretic approach to signal-
based trade is taken in [6] where, this time, the dividend is let endogenously
be determined by the action of the agent and its correspondence with the
realised fundamental. The signals, in this case, are related to the action
that needs to be taken. A sufficient level of signal precision is found to be
necessary and sufficient for establishing the case where both seller and buyer
are better off from trade in expectation (referred to as “common knowledge
of gains from trade” in [6]), which is the equilibrium.
So far, there is no clear mention of the explicit dynamics of information
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flow, which is the subject of heterogeneity, and it is understood to be an
‘immediate access’ to a publicly unknown value φ(XT ) without any noise
component. Building on [3] and [19], a learning component is added in [5].
This means the signals are now long-lived with a signal-to-noise varying in
time. Although this made possible the mentioning of information ‘flow’ in its
true meaning, the interpretation of ‘learning’ through signal in [5] is slightly
different in that when the noise-to-signal, i.e., reciprocal of signal-to-noise,
is large, this means the agent is learning a lot. Yet, interestingly, given
the total amount of information disparity in favour of the more informed,
the pattern in which the information flows is found to be rather irrelevant
in equilibrium. Later on, the long-lived signal process is associated with a
exponential distributed random deadline (as in [4] earlier) in [12]. In fact, a
random deadline changes the way the strategies for exploiting extra informa-
tion are structured in various ways, with one way being that agents do not
rush to unload their information before it becomes useless and, accordingly,
trade frantically as deadline approaches. Backward induction methods of
dynamics programming are also rendered inapplicable.
Perhaps the most interesting alternative to the models of ‘diverse infor-
mation’ models (where agents do generally share the same probability mea-
sure but work over distinct probability spaces) are those of ‘diverse beliefs’.
One way to account for the diversity of beliefs is through equivalent (i.e.,
defined over the same filtered probability space) probability measures which
reflect agents’ personal beliefs on the true value of the dividend, as in [9].
This is maintained by likelihood ratio martingales (or, density processes).
Interestingly, the equivalence of the latter two models is established, even
without a particular choice of explicit signal structure for private informa-
tion. And, not so interestingly, the greater the diversity of beliefs, the larger
the volume of trade is. A similar approach is found in [13] where an equilib-
rium is established in terms of ‘surviving agents.’ In a belief-heterogeneous
market, the surviving agent is found to be the one who is the most ra-
tional. Last but not least, in cognisance of the important role played by
dynamic optimisation in approaching heterogeneous financial market equi-
librium problems, we underline two recent accounts of the latter, i.e. [11]
and [14], where how, in a market of two agents with heterogeneous charac-
teristics, equilibria for various quantities can be found by means of a single
backward-induction algorithm is vividly shown.
The approach, in the rest of this paper, to being informationally advan-
tageous or disadvantageous is analogous to the one in [7]: we do not view the
difference between the latter two as having or not having immediate access
to the future value of a variable which is unknown to the public informa-
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tion. We rather view it as having access to efficient streams of information
or, equivalently (cf. [1]), being more capable to compile and process large
and complex datasets out of publicly available information. Both of these
are associated with a higher σ of ξ in the present context. Yet, in the sense
of [9], the present framework can also be seen as a diverse-belief model where
beliefs are shaped in time by the information itself.
2 Modelling Information Flow
The information-based framework was first introduced in [8] as a new way
of modelling credit risk and, later on, applied to a broad spectrum of issues
in financial mathematics, including the valuation of insurance contracts,
modelling of defaultable bonds, pricing of inflation-linked assets, and mod-
elling of insider trading, before it was generalised to a wider class of Le´vy
information processes in [17].
Accordingly, we introduce the signal process (ξt)0≤t≤T (or, the informa-
tion process in the sense of [8])
ξt = σtXT + βt. (1)
which is a Brownian random bridge (BRB), as defined in [17] for the general
class of Le´vy processes (i.e., Le´vy random bridges or LRBs). Here, βt (or,
explicitly β[0,0]0T (t)) is a standard Brownian bridge over the period [0, T ] which
takes on value 0 at the beginning and end, and σ is a measure of true signal to
noise (henceforth, just ‘signal-to-noise’). The latter governs the overall speed
of revelation of true information about the actual value of the fundamental
XT .
We also remark that Eq. (1) is not the only way to represent information
flow. Some other forms have also been considered in the literature with
slightly different characteristics, such as, ξt = tXT +βt, ξt = (t/T )XT +σβt
or ξt = (t/T )XT + βt.
More formally, we define a probability space (Ω,F ,Q), on which the
filtration (Fξt )t∈[0,T ] is constructed. Here, Q, i.e., the risk-neutral measure,
is assumed to exist. The default measure is set to Q throughout the thesis,
if not stated otherwise. The filtration Fξt is generated directly by (ξs)0≤s≤t
and, thus, simply by ξt itself. The latter simplification follows from the
Markov property of (ξs)0≤s≤t.
Proposition 1 The process (ξt)0≤t≤T , as defined in Eq. (1), is condition-
ally Markovian.
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Proof 1 Let XT = x. Defining Bt as a Brownian motion, we can indeed
express the signal process ξt as
σtx+ κ−
1
2
t Bt or σtx+ κ
− 12
t
∫ t
0
dBs. (2)
One can verify that these are identical to
ξt = σtx+ (T − t)
∫ t
0
dBs
T − s, (3)
which, in turn, implies
dξt =
(
σx−
∫ t
0
dBs
T − s
)
dt+ (T − t) dBt
T − t
=
(
σx− ξt − σtx(T − t)
)
dt+ dBt
= (σx− ξt/T )κtdt+ dBt. (4)
Equations (3) and (4) indeed follow from two other well-known repre-
sentations of bridges (see, e.g., [22]). Eq. (4), on the other hand, directly
implies that, given XT = x, ξt is a Markov process with respect to its own
filtration, i.e.,
E[h(ξt)|σ (ξr)r≤s] = E[h(ξt)|σ(ξs)] (s ≤ t), (5)
for any x, and any measurable, finite-valued function h (cf. [22]).
We are now in a position to work out, with respect to the available
information Fξt , the value St and dynamics dSt of an asset which generates
a cashflow φ(XT ) at time T for some invertible function φ. The value St,
0 ≤ t < T , is given by
St = δ−1t E
[
φ(XT )
∣∣Fξt ] = δ−1t E [φ(XT )∣∣ξt] = ∫
X
φ(x)pit(x)dx, (6)
where δt := 1{t<T}er(T−t) is the nume´raire and pit(x) := p(x|ξt) the posterior
density of the payoff. The quantities XT and φ(XT ) are measurable with
respect to FξT , but not necessarily w.r.t. Fξt , t < T . On an important note,
we remark that βt, i.e., the pure noise, is not measurable w.r.t. Fξt , meaning
that it is not directly accessible to market agents. Thus, an agent, although
he observes ξt, cannot separate true signal from noise until time T .
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Using Bayesian inference, St can be expressed as
St = δ−1t
∫
X
φ(x)p(x)eκt(σxξt−
1
2σ
2x2t)dx∫
X
p(x)eκt(σxξt−
1
2σ
2x2t)dx
, (7)
with κt := T/(T − t) and X is the support of payoff distribution, whereas
the PDE it satisfies as
dSt = rStdt+ ΛtdWt, (8)
with
Λt := δ−1t σκtCovt (φ(XT ), XT )
and
dWt := κt (ξt/T − σφt(XT )) dt+ dξt. (9)
One can indeed show, by referring to Le´vy’s characterisation [20], that Wt
is a Brownian motion adapted to F ξt (cf. [8]).
Corollary 2 Assume, as a particular case, that φ is an identity, i.e., φ(x) =
x, and XT ∼ N (0, 1) a priori. Then, Eq. (7) implies
St = δ−1t
σκtξt
σ2κtt+ 1
, (10)
where X = (−∞,∞).
3 Model Setup
We assume that there is a pure dealership market comprising risk-neutral
agents with heterogeneous informational access. For simplicity, and w.l.o.g.,
we assume there is a pair of agents, j = 1, 2, with access to the filtrations
generated by ξ1t , ξ2t , and a single risky asset with payoff φ(XT ) not being
measurable w.r.t. Fξt , t < T . We also assume σ1 < σ2, i.e., agent 2 is
informationally more susceptible than agent 1. In our dynamical model, for
simplicity of analysis, we suppose that agents trade with each other futures
contracts on the single risky asset at sequential auction times ti ∈ [0, T ]
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, without any intertemporal consumption and exogenous
wealth. Both agents simply follow a buy-and-hold strategy. In this setup,
execution of trades, besides a potential profit or loss, results in two things.
First, they help, e.g., the central-planner, consolidate information sets of
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agents at time ti to have a joint information bundle σ(ξ1ti , ξ
2
ti). Second, the
competitive market price will be discovered immediately. Below we will
analyse the latter two separately. Limit orders are cleared by a Walrasian
matching engine (as in [11]), which can be deemed a central-planner in the
context of [9] or a group of competitive market makers. The central-planner
aims solely to maximise the overall expected profit (or, utility) of agents.
We also note that, for any given t and a priori density p(x), the price is
a function of ξ and σ, i.e., St = S(ξ, σ). This means, if St is observed, then
one needs to know σ to be able to back out ξt. Without knowledge σ, the
observer cannot infer how reliable an observed sample of ξt is.
Moments before the sequential auction time ti, agents, having observed
their signals, submit to the central planner the bid and ask prices at which
they are willing to trade. One key property of our model is that an agent
may not necessarily know his signal is superior (i.e., agnostic) and the agents
will be able to infer each other’s prices, and also information (unless they
are ‘omitters’, as described below), when, and only if, a price match occurs
and a clearing price is set. Otherwise, limit orders are kept with the auction
engine (i.e., closed limit order trading book). This also rules out ‘bluffing’
(cf. [4, 12]).
Individual bid and ask prices are based on the signal-implied prices
worked out by virtue of Eq. (7) and trade occurs whenever
ς−S1t ≥ ς+S2t or ς−S2t ≥ ς+S1t , (11)
with ς− and ς+ being the constant bid and ask multipliers, respectively,
where ς− ≤ 1 and ς+ ≥ 1. Obviously, if Eq. (11) holds with equality, i.e., if
ς−S1t = ς+S2t or ς−S2t = ς+S1t , then the market price S∗t will be discovered
directly. In case of an inequality, under risk-neutrality assumption, the
market will clear at the mid-price:
S∗t =
ς−S1t + ς+S2t
2 or
ς−S2t + ς+S1t
2 . (12)
In [11], the authors vividly explain why the real-world interpretation of the
price posted by a Walrasian auctioneering computer is the bid-ask midpoint.
The initial contract holdings of agents, as denoted by θj0, j ∈ {1, 2}, are
set to 0. Here θjt denotes the total time-t net contract stock held by agent
j. We also define θt :=
∑
j θ
j
t as the total net contract ‘stock’ held by the
central clearing at time t. Accordingly, total net order ‘flow’ at time t should
be ∆θt which is given by
∆θt =
∑
j
∆θjt =
∑
j
qjt = qt (13)
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for some trading process (qjt )0≤t≤T , given by
qjt :=

qj+t , S
j
t > S
∗
t ,
qj−t , S
j
t < S
∗
t ,
0, otherwise,
(14)
with qj+t > 0, q
j−
t < 0. Market clearing conditions imply qt =
∑
j q
j
t = 0
and, therefore, θt = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Now we define the increasing process
(st)t∈[0,T ], i.e., the time of the last trade prior to time t, as follows:
st = sup{s : s < t, |qjs| > 0}. (15)
It is apparent that st is 0 if t = 0, or if t > 0 and qjs = 0 ∀s ∈ [0, t). The
ex-post (i.e., at contract expiry) profit/loss of agent j coming from time t
transaction can be written as
Πjt = 1H∩{Sjt>S∗t }q
j+
t (X − S∗t ) + 1H∩{Sjt<S∗t }q
j−
t (X − S∗t ) +(16)
1
L∩{Sjt<S∗t }q
j−
t (X − S∗t ) + 1L∩{Sjt>S∗t }q
j+
t (X − S∗t )
(or, simply) = qjt (X − S∗t ), (17)
where S∗t is as in Eq. (12), and H and L denote high- and low-type markets,
respectively (cf. [19]). Eq. (16) is based on the correspondence of signal
and reality. Market clearing conditions again will require Πt =
∑
j Π
j
t = 0
∀t ∈ [0, T ].
4 Numerical Analysis
We now present some numerical results based on the setup above. Let |qjt | ∈
{0, 1} and assume, in this first scenario, that both agents are “omitters” (or,
“stubborn bigots” of [9]) who never change their mind and simply execute
trades according to the following recurring procedure: (1) Observe signal
ξjt . (2) Quote signal-based bid and ask prices. (3) Let the central-planner
determine − using the pre-announced and legally binding matching rule
(12) − the trade direction, if any, and the transaction price (which are then
revealed to the agents). Note that agents execute trades “without” learning
from each other − who could, otherwise, update their information set − and
continue to rely solely on their own information sources.
In Figure 1, where the true fundamental value of X is set to 1, we
illustrate one possible path of such a scenario. Despite a bid-ask margin,
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Figure 1: Sample evolution of information-based transaction prices in sce-
nario 1 (|qjt | ∈ {0, 1}). Arbitrary parameter values: T = 1, ∆t = 1/10,
r = 0.05, σ ∈ [0.5, 1.5], and φ(XT ) ∈ {0, 1¯} (i.e., true value is set to 1) with
p0(x) ∈ [0.5, 0.5]. The dotted lines are bid and ask prices based on Sς− and
Sς+, respectively, with ς ∈ [0.95, 1.05].
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Figure 2: Evolution of information-based transaction P&L averaged over
103 path simulations and based on parameters from Figure 1, except that
∆t = 1/100.
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Figure 3: Evolution of information-based transaction P&L of multiple agents
averaged over 103 path simulations and based on parameters given in Figure
1 , except that ∆t = 1/100.
occurrence of trade is highly likely in this case as agents do not learn from
each other and as personal value judgements diverge. The informationally
more (less) susceptible agent, though unknowingly, keeps trading in the right
(wrong) direction due to superiority (inferiority) of his signal. Note from
Figure 1 that even after the agent with better signal discovers the asset’s
true value (around auction 5), he is still able to execute profitable trades
thanks to the matching rule. Figure 2, on the other hand, shows the profit-
and-loss (P&L) results of such a scenario for each time step averaged over
103 simulations, where the number of auctions is increased to 100. We note
at the first glance that the qualitative behaviour of the P&L agrees with the
qualitative behaviour of the magnitude of extra information held (cf. [7]).
On an additional note, when multiple (>2) agents with various informa-
tional capabilities are involved in the market, our numerical results presented
in Figure 3 suggest that, while P&L continue to agree with the qualitative
behaviour of the magnitude of extra information held by the agent, it is
also distributed between agents proportional to the quality of their signal
(particularly once the differential informational reaches an adequate level).
Yet, the exchanges generally do not operate quite this way. A more
realistic scenario would be that agents are “attentive” and infer their coun-
terpart’s posterior pijst(x), and, therefore, likelihood p(ξjst |x), from their price
quote at time st. This would mean having, at any time t, partial access to a
larger σ-algebra, e.g., for agent 1, σ¯(ξ1t ), generated by the join of σ(ξ1t ) and
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σ(ξ2st), i.e.,
σ¯(ξ1t ) = σ(ξ1t ) ∨ σ(ξ2st). (18)
Once agent 1 gains partial access to σ¯(ξ1t ), he updates his posterior from
pi1t (x) to p¯i1t (x) (by updating p(ξ1t |x) to p¯(ξ1t |x), i.e., the effective likelihood),
which will be again of the form, e.g., for agent 1,
p¯i1t (x) =
p(x)p¯(ξ1t |x)∫
X
p(x)p¯(ξ1t |x)dx
. (19)
Note that we intentionally avoid the notations σ(ξ1t , ξ2st) and p(ξ1t , ξ2st |x)
(and use σ¯(ξ1t ) and p¯(ξ1t |x) instead) so as not to mean that one party’s signal
is directly observable to the other at the last auction time st (which is also
not needed).
Thus, before submitting an order at time t, having observed a new signal
ξjt , the agent will need to update his effective information to σ¯(ξ
j
t ) = σ(ξ1t )∨
σ(ξ2st) (e.g., for agent 1) or σ(ξ1st) ∨ σ(ξ2t ) (in the case of agent 2). Also,
since ξt is Markovian, for an agent, partially accessing the signal sample ξjst
of his counterpart will be as valuable as partially accessing his entire signal
history
(
ξjs
)
s≤st . Accordingly, right before the auction at time t, the ‘useful’
effective likelihood p¯ for agent 1 will be
p(ξ1t , ξ2st |x) =
1
2pi
√
t/κt
√
st/κst
√
1− ρˆ2
· exp
(
−12
(st/κst)(ξ1t − σ1xt)2
(1− ρˆ2)(t/κt)(st/κst)
)
· exp
(
−12
−2ρˆ(ξ1t − σ1xt)(ξ2st − σ2xst)
√
(t/κt)
√
(st/κst)
(1− ρˆ2)(t/κt)(st/κst)
)
· exp
(
−12
(t/κt)(ξ2st − σ2xst)2
(1− ρˆ2)(t/κt)(st/κst)
)
, (20)
where we used the relation β1st = ρβ2st +
√
1− ρ2β¯st , with β2st ⊥ β¯st , to find
ρˆ, i.e., the correlation between ξ1t and ξ2st conditional on x, as follows:
ρˆ =
Cov(β1t , β2st)
σβ1t σβ2st
=
Cov(ρβ2t +
√
1− ρ2β¯t, β2st)√
t/κt
√
st/κst
= ρ st/κt√
t/κt
√
st/κst
= ρ
√
st
t
κst
κt
, (21)
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Figure 4: Sample evolution of information-based transaction prices along
a sample path in scenario 2 (|qjt | ∈ {0, 1}). Arbitrary parameter values:
T = 1, ∆t = 1/10, r = 0.05, σ ∈ [0.5, 1.5], and φ(XT ) ∈ {0, 1¯} with
p0(x) ∈ [0.5, 0.5]. The dotted lines are bid and ask prices based on Sς− and
Sς+, respectively, with ς ∈ [0.95, 1.05].
with ρ being the correlation between ξ1st and ξ2st . We note that ρˆ is a de-
creasing function of time, as expected, and also that, when ρˆ = 0, Eq. (20)
simply reduces to
p(ξ1t , ξ2st |x) =
1
2pi
√
t/κt
√
s/κst
· exp
(
−12
(st/κs)(ξ1t − σ1xt)2
(t/κt)(st/κst)
)
· exp
(
−12
(t/κt)(ξ2st − σ2xst)2
(t/κt)(st/κst)
)
, (22)
which also reduces to p(ξ1t |x) when st = 0 (no trade). The signal-based price
of agent j, Sjt , is then given by
Sjt = E
[
X|σ¯(ξjt )
]
. (23)
Accordingly, the new trading procedure is as follows: (1) Observe signal
ξjt . (1a) Work out σ¯(ξ
j
t ). (2) Quote signal-based bid and ask prices based
on effective information. (3) Let the central-planner do his work (same as
(3) above).
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Figure 5: Evolution of information-based transaction P&L averaged over a
series of 103 path simulations and based on parameters given in Figure 4,
except that ∆t = 1/100.
One realisation of this second scenario is depicted in Figure 4. At the
first glance, learning seems to have decreased profit margins substantially
(i.e., to a level where they are often eaten up by the spread, preventing
trade). In Figure 5, we again show average stepwise P&L of agents over 103
realisations. It is apparent from the figure that the informationally more
susceptible agent is no more able to extract rents that are as large as in
the first scenario (see Figure 2), although he is still able to maintain some
modest profits. His ability to maintain modest profits is most likely due
to the lag in the learning process as there is still a room for the superior
signal to provide the agent receiving it with extra information in-between
auctions. The huge difference between the outcomes of two scenarios, i.e.,
“omitter” and “attentive”, implies that, when each agent deems his own
signal superior, there might exist optimal strategies where agents can still
be “attentive” but, this time, choose which time to reveal their information
through trade.
To conclude this section, we compare, in Figures 6-7, the impact of
allowing mutual learning on the speeds at which the two agents discover
the true fundamental value of the asset. In the case where the differential
between information flow speeds is high (refer to Figure 6), learning seems
to work more in favour of the agent with less superior signal with little or
no benefit to the agent with a superior signal, whereas, when the differential
is minimal (cf. Figure 7), both agents equally benefit from sharing their
13
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Figure 6: Learning process: Bayesian updating of posteriors pijt (x) averaged
over 103 path simulations and based on parameters given in Figure 4, except
that ∆t = 1/100.
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Figure 7: Learning process: Bayesian updating of posteriors pijt (x) averaged
over 103 path simulations and based on parameters given in Figure 4, except
that ∆t = 1/100.
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information via trading.
5 Signal-based Optimal Strategy
The P&L figures provided in Section 3 are ex-post, i.e., calculated at the
terminal date. In reality, when they trade, agents do so based on their signal-
based expectations about the true fundamental value to be revealed at time
T . They learn whether their earlier trades in futures contracts turned out
to be a profit or loss again at time T . This, in fact, establishes the main
argument which calls for the existence of optimal choices of trading times
which maximise their signal-based expected profits: both agents believe that
their trades will make them better off (or, there exists ‘a common knowledge
of gains from trade’ in the sense of [6]). Throughout this section, we will
regard the agents as ‘attentive,’ and assume ς± = 1.
5.1 Characterisation of Expected Profit
We recall from Section 4 that, just before the auction at time t, the agent j
observes the value of his signal and works out his effective information σ¯(ξjt )
before he makes a judgement of the asset’s value. Assuming X ∈ {X l, Xh}
and, again, |qjt | ∈ {0, 1}, the expected (ex-ante) profit of agent j from his
possible trade at time t can be decomposed as follows:
Ejt
[
Πjt
]
= P jt (ξc)
∣∣Xh − Ejt [S∗t |ξc]∣∣− P jt (ξe)∣∣Xh − Ejt [S∗t |ξe]∣∣ (24)
with P jt (ξc) and P
j
t (ξe) being the chances of agent j getting correct and
erroneous signals at time t, respectively. And, again, Et[·] = E[·|σ¯(ξt)].
More formally,
P jt (ξc) = P
j
t (H)P
j
t (ξc|H) + P jt (L)P j(ξc|L) (25)
= P jt (H)P j(S
j
t > S
∗
t |H) + P jt (L)P j(Sjt < S∗t |L),
P jt (ξe) = P
j
t (H)P
j
t (ξe|H) + P jt (L)P j(ξe|L) (26)
= P jt (H)P j(S
j
t < S
∗
t |H) + P jt (L)P j(Sjt > S∗t |L),
where, again, H and L denote high- and low-type markets in the sense of
[19], and
Ejt
[
Πjt
]
= P jt (ξc)
∣∣Xh − Ejt [S∗t |ξc]∣∣− P jt (ξe)∣∣Xh − Ejt [S∗t |ξe]∣∣ (27)
15
with P jt (ξc) and P
j
t (ξe) being the chances of agent j getting correct and
erroneous signals at time t, respectively. And, again, Et[·] = E[·|σ¯(ξt)].
More formally,
P jt (ξc) = P
j
t (H)P
j
t (ξc|H) + P jt (L)P j(ξc|L) (28)
= P jt (H)P j(S
j
t > S
∗
t |H) + P jt (L)P j(Sjt < S∗t |L),
P jt (ξe) = P
j
t (H)P
j
t (ξe|H) + P jt (L)P j(ξe|L) (29)
= P jt (H)P j(S
j
t < S
∗
t |H) + P jt (L)P j(Sjt > S∗t |L),
where, again, H and L denote high- and low-type markets in the sense of
[19], and
(ξc|H) := (Sjt > S∗t |H), (ξc|L) := (Sjt < S∗t |L)
(ξe|H) := (Sjt < S∗t |H), (ξe|L) := (Sjt > S∗t |L). (30)
Then, Eq. (27) can be written more explicitly as follows:
Ejt
[
Πjt
]
= P jt (H)
(
P jt (ξc|H)
(
Xh − Ejt [S∗t |H, ξc]
)
−P jt (ξe|H)
(
Xh − Ejt [S∗t |H, ξe]
))
+
P jt (L)
(
P jt (ξc|L)
(
Ejt [S∗t |L, ξc]−X l
)
−P jt (ξe|L)
(
Ejt [S∗t |L, ξe]−X l
))
,
(31)
where
P jt (H) = P
j
t (Xh) =
phe
κtf(t,σj ,ξj ,xh)∑
k∈{h,l} pkeκtf(t,σj ,ξ
j ,xk)
,
P jt (L) = P
j
t (X l) =
ple
κtf(t,σj ,ξj ,xl)∑
k∈{h,l} pkeκtf(t,σj ,ξ
j ,xk)
, (32)
with f(t, σ, ξ, x) := σξtx− (1/2)σ2x2t. When the payoff, i.e., φ(X) = X, is
continuous, however, Eq. (31) implies
Ejt
[
Πjt
]
= P jt (H)
(∫
Xh
(
P jt (ξc|H,x)
(
x− Ejt [S∗t (x)|H, ξc]
)
−P jt (ξe|H,x)
(
x− Ejt [S∗t (x)|H, ξe]
))
pij+t (x)dx
)
+
P jt (L)
(∫
Xl
(
P jt (ξc|L, x)
(
Ejt [S∗t (x)|L, ξc)]− x
)
−P jt (ξe|L, x)
(
Ejt [S∗t (x)|L, ξe]− x
))
pij−t (x)dx
)
, (33)
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where Xh = (S∗0 , Xmax) and Xl = (Xmin, S∗0); pi
j+
t and pi
j−
t are normalised
posteriors for high- and low-type markets, respectively; and, at this time,
P jt (H) :=
∫
Xh
pijt (x)dx, and P
j
t (L) :=
∫
Xl
pijt (x)dx. (34)
The notation S(x) is used to denote E[X|ξ(x)], i.e., the signal-based price
of the agent when the actual signal is pinned to the value x. In a nutshell,
expected profit of the agent is decomposed, through Eq. (31) and (33),
into two components, i.e., whether the agent’s signal is pointing at the right
(wrong) trade direction and, in that case, what the expected profit (loss)
would be.
5.1.1 Directional Quality of Trading Signal (Digital Dividend)
Assume, without loss of generality, that X ∈ {x0, x1}, with x0 = 0, x1 > 0
and the prior knowledge of the pair (p0, p1). In fact, any binary payoff
structure X ∈ {x0, x1}, x1 > x0 can be simplified as {0, x1−x0} (a property
which will simplify our calculations below). Let the true value of X be x1.
Equation (31) implies
Ejt
[
Πjt
]
= P jt (x1)
(
P jt (ξc|x1)
(
x1 − Ejt [S∗t (x1)|ξc]
)
−P jt (ξe|x1)
(
x1 − Ejt [S∗t (x1)|ξe]
))
+
P jt (x0)
(
P jt (ξc|x0)
(
Ejt [S∗t (x0)|ξc]− x0
)
−P jt (ξe|x0)
(
Ejt [S∗t (x0)|ξe]− x0
))
. (35)
We can calculate the likelihoods of receiving a correct trade signal for agent
1 when st = s > 0 (i.e., agents did already exchange their information
through trading before time t) in high- and low-type markets, respectively,
as follows:
P 1t (ξc|x1, s) = P
(
S1t (x1, s) > S∗t (x1, s)
)
= P
(
S1t (x1, s)/2 > S2t (x1, s)/2
)
= P
(∑
k=1,2 xkpke
κtf(t,σ1,ξ1,xk)+κsf(s,σ2,ξ2,xk)∑
k=1,2 pke
κtf(t,σ1,ξ1,xk)+κsf(s,σ2,ξ2,xk)
>
∑
k=1,2 xkpke
κtf(t,σ2,ξ2,xk)+κsf(s,σ1,ξ1,xk)∑
k=1,2 pke
κtf(t,σ2,ξ2,xk)+κsf(s,σ1,ξ1,xk)
)
. (36)
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A straightforward calculation yields
P 1t (ξc|x1, s) = P
(
x1p1e
κtf(t,σ1,ξ1,x1)+κsf(s,σ2,ξ2,x1)/(p0 + p1eκtf(t,σ1,ξ
1,x1)+κsf(s,σ2,ξ2,x1))
> x1p1e
κtf(t,σ2,ξ2,x1)+κsf(s,σ1,ξ1,x1)/(p0 + p1eκtf(t,σ2,ξ
2,x1)+κsf(s,σ1,ξ1,x1))
)
= P
(
σ1
(
κtξ
1
t − κsξ1s
)
− 12σ
2
1x1 (tκt − sκs) > σ2
(
κtξ
2
t − κsξ2s
)
− 12σ
2
2x1 (tκt − sκs)
)
= P
(
σ1
(
κt
(
σ1tx1 + β1t
)
− κs
(
σ1sx1 + β1s
))
− σ2
(
κt
(
σ2tx1 + β2t
)
− κs
(
σ2sx1 + β2s
))
>
1
2x1 (tκt − sκs)
(
σ21 − σ22
))
= P
(
σ1
(
κtβ
1
t − κsβ1s
)
− σ2
(
κtβ
2
t − κsβ2s
)
>
1
2x1 (tκt − sκs)
(
σ22 − σ21
))
= P
((
σ21κ
2
t t/κt − σ21κ2ss/κs
) 1
2 z1 −
(
σ22κ
2
t t/κt − σ22κ2ss/κs
) 1
2 z2
>
1
2x1 (tκt − sκs)
(
σ22 − σ21
))
= Θ
(
1
2
x1(tκt − sκs)
(
σ21 − σ22
)(
σ21 + σ22
)1/2 (tκt − sκs)1/2
)
(s, t < T ),
(37)
where, again, Θ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The last line simply follows from z1 ⊥ z2 and z1,2 ∼ N (0, 1). Similarly,
by arranging the last three lines of Eq. (37) and changing the direction of
inequality from > to <, we can indeed verify that
P 1t (ξc|x0, s) = P 1t (ξc|x1, s) (38)
and, moreover, by virtue of convex combination in Eq. (25), that
P 1t (ξc|s) = P 1t (ξc|x1, s) = P 1t (ξc|x0, s). (39)
Equations (38) and (37) then directly imply
P 2t (ξc|s) = 1− P 1t (ξc|s) = P 1t (ξe|s). (40)
Thus, the chances of agent j getting a correct (or erroneous) signal are the
same no matter if the market is bullish or bearish, and one agent’s success is
the other one’s failure, as expected. Note also that P 1t (ξc|x1, s) in Eq. (37)
is not a function of the value of agent j’s specific information at time t, i.e.,
σ¯(ξjt ), but rather depends only on the differential between information flow
speeds, σ1 and σ2 (or, how agents perceive it), and the spread of X.
18
Eq. (37) indeed reveals a number of intuitive properties, such as: (i)
the larger the differential |σ1 − σ2|, the more likely the agent with superior
signal will get a correct signal (ξc), (ii) with |σ1 − σ2| given, the agent with
superior signal will prefer more uncertainty (i.e., greater spread for X) to less
uncertainty (i.e., smaller spread for X), and, (iii) with |σ1 − σ2| and spread
of X given, refraining from a trade will always result in greater chances of
getting a correct signal (although there will be a cost to refraining).
To complete the case where the contract pays a binary dividend, we
state, by virtue of Eq. (35), the expected ‘profit-to-go’ of agent j at time t:
T∑
u=t
Ejt
[
ΠjuT
]
=
T∑
u=t
P jt (x1)
(
P ju(ξc|x1, su)
(
x1 − Ejt [S∗u(x1)|ξc]
)
−P ju(ξe|x1)
(
x1 − Ejt [S∗u(x1)|ξe]
))
+
T∑
u=t
P jt (x0)
(
P ju(ξc|x0)
(
Ejt [S∗u(x0)|ξc]− x0
)
−P ju(ξe|x0)
(
Ejt [S∗u(x0)|ξe]− x0
))
. (41)
Note that we preserve the subscript t for pj and Ej as they will be inferred
based on the effective information at time t, i.e., σ¯(ξjt ). Below we generalise
the above results to the case where X has a continuous distribution.
5.1.2 Directional Quality of Trading Signal (Gaussian Dividend)
We first redefine the likelihoods of high- and low-type markets (see Eq. (34)):
P jt (x+) =
∫
X+
pijt (x)dx, P
j
t (x−) =
∫
X−
pijt (x)dx, (42)
where X+ = (0,∞) and X− = (−∞, 0). When st = s is non-zero, Eq. (10)
takes the form
S1t = 1{t<T}e−r(T−t)
σ1κtξ1t + σ2κsξ2s
σ21κtt+ σ22κss+ 1
, (43)
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Then, the chances for agent 1 having right trade signals in high- and low-
type markets can be found as follows. Let X = x, x > 0 (high-type). Then,
P 1t (ξc|x+, s) =
∫
X+
P 1(S1t (x) > S∗t (x)|s)p¯i1+t (x)dx
=
∫
X+
P 1(S1t (x)/2 > S2t (x)/2|s)p¯i1+t (x)dx
=
∫
X+
P
(
1
2
σ1κtξ1t + σ2κsξ2s
σ21tκt + σ22sκs + 1
− 12
σ2κtξ2t + σ1κsξ1s
σ22tκt + σ21sκs + 1
> 0
)
p¯i1+t (x)dx
=
∫
X+
P
(
1
2
σ1κt(σ1tx+ β1t )
σ21tκt + σ22sκs + 1
− 12
σ1κs(σ1sx+ β1s )
σ21sκs + σ22tκt + 1
−
(
1
2
σ2κt(σ2tx+ β2t )
σ22tκt + σ21sκs + 1
− 12
σ2κs(σ2sx+ β2s )
σ22sκs + σ21tκt + 1
)
> 0
)
p¯i1+t (x)dx
=
∫
X+
Θ
(
−a
s
t
bst
x
)
p¯i1+t (x)dx (ast , bst , x > 0), (44)
where, again, z1,2 are independently N (0, 1), p¯i+ is the normalised effective
posterior density as given in Eq. (19),
ast =
1
2
(
σ22tκt
σ22tκt + σ21sκs + 1
− σ
2
2sκs
σ22sκs + σ21tκt + 1
)
−12
(
σ21tκt
σ21tκt + σ22sκs + 1
− σ
2
1sκs
σ21sκs + σ22tκt + 1
)
, (45)
bst =
1
2
[(
σ1κt
σ21tκt + σ22sκs + 1
)2
(t/κt) +
(
σ1κs
σ21sκs + σ22tκt + 1
)2
(s/κs)
−2
(
σ1κt
σ21tκt + σ22sκs + 1
)(
σ1κs
σ21sκs + σ22tκt + 1
)
(s/κt)
+
(
σ2κt
σ22tκt + σ21sκs + 1
)2
(t/κt) +
(
σ2κs
σ22sκs + σ21tκt + 1
)2
(s/κs)
−2
(
σ2κt
σ22tκt + σ21sκs + 1
)(
σ2κs
σ22sκs + σ21tκt + 1
)
(s/κt)
] 1
2
. (46)
Indeed, we can quickly verify that ast > 0 (i.e., x > y implies x/(x+1) >
y/(y + 1). Moreover, similar to the digital payoff case, it directly fol-
lows from (44) that P 1t (ξc|x+, s) = P 1t (ξc|x−, s), P 1t (ξc|s) = P 1t (ξc|x+, s) =
P 1t (ξc|x−, s), and P 2t (ξc|s) = 1− P 1t (ξc|s) = P 1t (ξe|s).
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For a low-type market, similarly,
P 1t (ξc|x−, s) =
∫
X−
Θ
(
ast
bst
x
)
pi−t (x)dx (ast , bst > 0, x < 0)
=
∫
X+
Θ
(
−a
s
t
bst
x
)
pi+t (x)dx (ast , bst > 0, x > 0)
= P 1t (ξc|x+, s). (47)
Expected profit-to-go at time t can be inferred in a similar sense to Eq.
(35). As a final step to calculate the signal-based expected profit of then
agent at time t (i.e., just before the auction), as given in Eq. (33), we now
compute the expected transaction price in low- and high-type markets and
with correct and erroneous signals. Note that
E1t
[
S∗t (x)
∣∣x+, ξc, s] = 1/2 (S1t (x) + E1t [S2t (x)∣∣x+, ξc, s])
= S1t (x)− E
[
1/2
(
S1t (x)− S2t (x)
)+∣∣x+, s] , (48)
E1t
[
S∗t (x)
∣∣x+, ξe, s] = 1/2 (S1t (x) + E1t [S2t (x)∣∣x+, ξe, s])
= S1t (x) + E
[
1/2
(
S2t (x)− S1t (x)
)+∣∣x+, s] , (49)
E1t
[
S∗t (x)
∣∣x−, ξc] = 1/2 (S1t (x) + E1t [S2t (x)∣∣x−, ξc, s])
= S1t (x) + E
[
1/2
(
S2t (x)− S1t (x)
)+∣∣x−, s] (50)
and
E1t
[
S∗t (x)
∣∣x−, ξe] = 1/2 (S1t (x) + E1t [S2t (x)∣∣x−, ξe, s])
= S1t (x)− E
[
1/2
(
S1t (x)− S2t (x)
)+∣∣x−, s] . (51)
Notice that we dropped t and j from Ejt ’s in Eq. (48)-(51) since, by Eq.
(44), when (ξjt )0≤t≤T is pinned to a certain value x, the price differential
is not conditional on the specific value of agent j’s signal at time t, but
rather a function of σ1, σ2, t and s. Thus, all one needs to do (so as
to compute the expected transaction price under different market situations
and trading signal quality) is to work out the expected value of the ‘absolute
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price differential’ under each circumstance. To that end, we can infer from
Eq. (44) that (
1/2
(
S2t (x)− S1t (x)
)∣∣x+, s) ∼ N (astx, bst ),(
1/2
(
S2t (x)− S1t (x)
)∣∣x−, s) ∼ N (astx, bst ),(
1/2
(
S1t (x)− S2t (x)
)∣∣x+, s) ∼ N (−astx, bst ),(
1/2
(
S1t (x)− S2t (x)
)∣∣x−, s) ∼ N (−astx, bst ),
where ast , bst > 0 are as given above. As a result,
E
[
1/2
(
S2t (x)− S1t (x)
)+∣∣x+, s] =

η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y−ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy, x > 0,
η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y+ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy, x < 0,
= E
[
1/2
(
S1t (x)− S2t (x)
)+∣∣x−, s] ,
(52)
and
E
[
1/2
(
S1t (x)− S2t (x)
)+∣∣x+, s] =

η2
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y+ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy, x > 0,
η2
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y−ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy, x < 0,
= E
[
1/2
(
S2t (x)− S1t (x)
)+∣∣x−, s] ,
(53)
with density normalising factors η1, η2. Thus, under the Gaussian payoff
scenario, we have derived explicit formulae for the two main sources of un-
certainty involved in signal-based trade, namely, the likelihood of a signal’s
pointing at the right (wrong) trade direction, and the expected amount of
profit (loss) given the signal was correct (erroneous). With inputs from Eq.
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(44) and (48)-(51), Eq. (33) can now be written for agent 1 as
E1t
[
Π1t
]
= P 1t (x+)
∫
X+
Θ(−ast
bst
x
)
η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y+ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
−Θ
(
ast
bst
x
)
η2
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y−ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
 p¯i1+t (x)dx
+
P 1t (x−)
∫
X−
Θ(ast
bst
x
)
η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y−ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
−Θ
(
−a
s
t
bst
x
)
η2
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y+ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
 p¯i1−t (x)dx
 ,
(54)
where p¯i+, p¯i− are, again, normalised effective posteriors for high- and low-
type markets, with X+ = (0,∞) and X− = (−∞, 0). Equation (54) can also
be written for agent 2 without much effort. Accordingly, agent j updates
his trading procedure as follows: (1)-(1a) Same as in Section 4 above. (1b)
Calculate Ejt [Π
j
t ] based on Eq. (54). (1c) Decide whether to quote or not to
quote a price. If yes, proceed to next step. (2) Quote signal-based price (as
ς± = 1). (3) Same as in Section 4 above.
Now, equipped with the flexibility to shape his strategy (qjt )0≤t≤T , |qjt | ∈
{0, 1}, by timing his trades, agent j will need to develop an optimal ‘online’
trading rule (referring to (1c) above) that maximises his profits, in under-
standing of his marginal benefits and losses from seizing or skipping a trade
opportunity.
5.2 Risk-neutral Optimal Strategy
It is not difficult to see that E1t
[
Π1t
]
in Eq. (54) will always be negative
when agent knows that his information is less superior. The top and bot-
tom left panels of Figure 8, in this regard, depicts the evolution in time of
E1t
[
Π1t
]
, based on almost all possible strategies and a sample path of ξ1t ,
when an agent believes that he is informationally less susceptible than his
counterpart. Yet, the agent can minimise his chances of losing from a trade
by keeping his information up-to-date through trading at “each” time step
(i.e., the top edge of each shape in the left panel). We note that the marginal
expected cost of refraining from trade for the less susceptible agent is always
positive when the agent believes he is informationally less susceptible.
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We therefore infer from Figure 8 that a solution to the maximisation
problem in Eq. (55) is unattainable from the perspective of a less infor-
mationally capable agent. The real-world implication of this is that market
shutdowns may not occur in a real market setting because investors think
their effective information are either constantly or temporarily superior to
the market information. We, thus, turn our focus to the case where both
agents believe their information source is characterised by a higher σ.
The top and bottom right panels of Figure 8, on the other hand, shows
the evolution in time of Ejt
[
Πjt
]
for the agent who believes that he is infor-
mationally more susceptible. The strategy which results in the bottom edge
these shapes on the right panel is unique, i.e., |qjt | = 1 ∀t. However, there
is no single strategy which can achieve the top edge of each shape, which is
a combination of different strategies that result in the maximum expected
potential at different time points.
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Figure 8: Evolution of Ejt [Π
j
t ] as given in Eq. (54) for sample trajectories of
ξ1t and ξ2t and all possible trading strategies. The dividend is assumed to be
Gaussian.
We define the optimal strategy of an agent as the one which maximises
his overall expected terminal profit from trading the contract based on his
24
effective information σ¯(ξjt ), i.e., for agent 1,
arg max(q1t )
T∑
t=0
E1t
[
Π1t
]
=
T∑
t=0
E
[
Π1t |σ¯(ξ1t )
]
s.t. S∗t = 1/2(S1t + S2t ), (55)
qt = 0
∀t,
where σ¯(ξ1t ) is same as in Eq. (18).
On an extra note, we remark that setting a mid-price, as in Eq. (12)
and (55), is indeed equivalent to
E
[
q1t (X − S∗t )|σ¯(ξ1t )
]
= E
[
q2t (X − S∗t )|σ¯(ξ2t )
]
. (56)
Thus, we can reinterpret the role of the central planner, in the context of
this section, as ‘to observe ξ¯jt ’s through price quotes and set the transaction
price as the mid-price which equates the signal-based terminal profits of
agents.’
Similar to [11], we can define the dynamic programming formulation of
the agent j’s problem given in Eq. (55) as follows:
V jt = sup
(qjt )
(
Ejt
[
Πjt
]
+ Ejt
[
V jt+1
])
, (57)
where V jt is the value function. Note that E
j
t [Π
j
t ] is implicitly determined
by (qjs)0≤s<t, whereas E
j
t [V
j
t+1] by (qjs)0≤s≤t. Therefore, at each auction, the
agent will need to consider the marginal impact of his current strategy on
Ejt [V
j
t+1]. The particular nature of the present model, however, does not
allow us to employ a backward-induction technique that is similar to the
one described in [11] and [14].
Based on Eq. (57), we introduce the following real-time optimal trading
strategy for agent j:
|qjt | =

1, if Ejt
[
Πjt
]
> 0,
and Ejt
[
Πjt
]
+ Ejt
[
Πjt+1
]
|qjt |=1
> Ejt
[
Πjt+1
]
qjt=0
,
0, otherwise,
(58)
where the term
Ejt [Π
j
t ]−
(
Ejt [Π
j
t+1]qjt=0 − E
j
t [Π
j
t+1]|qjt |=1
)
(59)
25
can be seen as the immediate expected gain from trade adjusted for the
cost of losing the informational advantage. Thus, the agent chooses to trade
whenever his cost-adjusted expected gain from trade is strictly positive. In
other words, whenever an agent refrains from trade in expectation of greater
future profits, he should do so on the basis that he has to recover immediate
cost of refraining.
Figure 9 plots the value of (59) (averaged over a number of sample paths
of ξjt ) for the more informationally susceptible agent for each point t in the
trading horizon and given each possible trading history st. The decision
rule variable is positive for any possible past strategy characterised by the
last time of trade, qjst , implying that the agent can maximise the sum of his
expected terminal profits by trading at each time point t, thereby constantly
incorporating his differential information into prices, i.e., |qjt | = 1 ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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Figure 9: Value of cost-adjusted expected gain from trade (averaged over
a number of sample paths of ξjt ) for the more informationally susceptible
agent based on Eq. (58) for all t and st.
We can indeed show that the optimality of this strategy is invariant to
the path of ξjt . Consider agent 2 who deems his signal superior (σ2 > σ1)
and let the market be high-type (i.e., x ∈ X+). For given x, σ1, σ2, let’s
denote the corresponding integrand in Eq. (54), rearranged for agent 2, by
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H2(t, s), where
H2(t, s) = Θ
(
ast
bst
x
)
η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y−ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
−Θ
(
−a
s
t
bst
x
)
η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
ye
− 12
(y+ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy. (60)
Note that H2(t, s) in Eq. (60) is the expected profit of agent 2 at time
t given the time of last trade, s, and a high-type payoff x, and it is not a
function of ξ2t . Agent 2 version of Eq. (54) is, in fact, nothing but the sum of
convex combinations of H2(t, s) and its low-market analogous L2(t, s) with
respect to the effective posteriors p¯i2+t and p¯i2−t , respectively. Thus, similar
to the relation (59),
H2(t, s)− [H2(t+ 1, s)−H2(t+ 1, t)] (61)
can be seen as the signal-independent version of the cost-adjusted immediate
gain from trade (for the agent who deems his signal superior), whose value
is depicted in Figure 10. It can be inferred from the figure, again, that it is
optimal for the informationally more susceptible agent to trade continuously
without accumulating his extra information.
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Figure 10: Value of signal-independent cost-adjusted expected gain from
trade for the more informationally susceptible agent based on Eq. (58) for
all t and st.
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5.3 Extension to Risk-adjusted Performance
In case agents are risk-adjusted expected profit (e.g., Sharpe ratio, [23])
maximisers “at the portfolio level”, the objective function in Eq. (55) can
simply be modified as
arg max
(qjt )
T∑
t=0
qjtE
j
t
[
Πjt
]
(
T∑
t=0
(qjt )2V
j
t
(
Πjt
))1/2 . (62)
We then write the conditional variance Vjt (Π
j
t ) = Vj(Π
j
t |σ¯(ξjt )) of the
signal-based profit at time t, whose expectation is given in Eq. (54) as
V1t (Π1t ) = p1t (x+)
∫
X+
Θ(−ast
bst
x
)2
η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
y2e
− 12
(y+ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
−Θ
(
ast
bst
x
)2
η2
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
y2e
− 12
(y−ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
 p¯i1+t (x)dx
+
p1t (x−)
∫
X−
Θ(ast
bst
x
)2
η1
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
y2e
− 12
(y−ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
−Θ
(
−a
s
t
bst
x
)2
η2
1√
2pibst
∫ ∞
0
y2e
− 12
(y+ast x)
2
(bs
t
)2 dy
 p¯i1−t (x)dx

−
(
E1t [Π1t ]
)2
. (63)
Figure 11 depicts the risk-adjusted version of Figure 8 using the same
signal sample as in the latter.
5.4 Extension to Risk-averse Utility
The above setup can easily be generalised to the case where agents are
‘characteristically’ risk-averse and attach decreasing marginal utility to each
extra unit of expected return due to the additional risk involved. In [6],
the authors show that the following two cases are equivalent: (a) terminal
payoff is exogenous (as in our case) and agents are risk-averse, (b) dividend
is endogenous and agents are risk-neutral. When the asset dividend (or
terminal payoff) is exogenous and agents’ actions have no impact on it, one
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Figure 11: Evolution of Sharpe ratio based on Vjt (Π
j
t ) given in Eq. (63)
for sample trajectories of ξ1t and ξ2t and all possible trading strategies. The
dividend is assumed to be Gaussian.
needs to introduce either trade quotas or proper risk aversion assumptions
to prevent agents from trading unlimited amounts to make infinite profits,
should quoted prices be in their favour. In the presence of informational
differences, there would be less or no motivation for agents who are not
only informationally less capable but also risk averse to actively participate
in a market where the participants are assumed to be rational. Such state
of affairs can, in fact, exacerbate the situations where markets shut down
due to perceived differential information. Such situations are avoided in
the literature by introducing the concept of ‘noise-traders’, which we avoid
in the present context so as to focus solely on the influence of differential
information on market phenomena.
We assume that agents are risk-averse with the utility assigned to a sure
dividend x, i.e.,
Uj(x) = −e−λjx (λj > 0), (64)
that is characterised by a constant absolute risk aversion level λj . We note
that the utility function U : (0,∞) → R in Eq. (64) is C2, and satisfies
U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0 as well as the Inada conditions [18]. Under U , the certainty
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equivalent of E[X] for agent j is given by
xjc = −
ln
(
−E
[
Uj(X)|σ¯(ξjt )
])
λj
(65)
with xjc < E[X|σ¯(ξ2t )] following from strict concavity. Assuming again X
is normal with N (0, 1), the equilibrium strategy in a market where agents
maximise their expected utility from terminal wealth is now associated to
the objective function which is analogous to Eq. (55) and (62) and given by
arg max(qjt )
T∑
t=0
E
[
Uj(Πjt )
∣∣σ¯(ξjt )] (66)
where each signal-based price Sjt is worked out, this time, according to
certainty equivalence relation in Eq. (65) as follows (assuming st = 0 for
simplicity):
Uj(Sjt ) = E
[
Uj(±X)
∣∣ξjt ] = −
∫
X
e−λj±xe−
x2
2 eκt(σjξ
j
tx− 12σ2jx2t)dx∫
X
e−
x2
2 eκt(σjξ
2
t x− 12σ2jx2r)dx
= −
∫
X
e−
x2
2 e(σjκtξ
j
t∓λj)x−( 12σ2jκtt)x2dx∫
X
e−
x2
2 e(σjκtξ
j
t )x−( 12σ2jκtt)x2dx
= −e
(σjκtξ
j
t
∓λj)2
2(σ2
j
κtt+1) e
− (σjκtξ
j
t
)2
2(σ2
j
κtt+1)
= −e
1
2
λ2
j
σ2
j
κtt+1
∓σjκtξ
j
t
λj
σ2
j
κtt+1 . (67)
This implies, for a bid quote,
Sjt = U−1j (E
[
Uj(X)
∣∣ξjt ]) = σjκtξjtσ2jκtt+ 1 − 12 λjσ2jκtt+ 1 (68)
and, similarly, for an ask quote,
Sjt = −U−1j (E
[
Uj(−X)
∣∣ξjt ]) = σjκtξjtσ2jκtt+ 1 + 12 λjσ2jκtt+ 1 . (69)
The second term in Eq. (68) and (69) can be considered as the “information-
adjusted risk premium” and appears naturally as the bid/ask spread which
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is inversely proportional to σj and t. Thus, given λj and t, the more an
agent is informationally more (less) susceptible, the lower (higher) a risk
premium he will have.
The central planner, on his side, will set the price transaction price to
the one which equalises their individual signal-based expected utility from
the transaction, i.e.,
E
[
U
(
q1t (X − S∗t )
)
|ξ1t
]
= E
[
U
(
q2t (X − S∗t )
)
|ξ2t
]
. (70)
Assuming again |qjt | ∈ {0, 1}, market is a high-type and agent 2 buys,
the pricing rule in Eq. (70) can be arranged further as follows:
−
∫
X
e−λ1(S
∗
t−x)e−
x2
2 eκt(σ1ξ1t x−
1
2σ
2
1x
2t)dx∫
X
e−
x2
2 eκt(σ1ξ1t x−
1
2σ
2
1x
2t)dx
= −
∫
X
e−λ2(x−S
∗
t )e−
x2
2 eκt(σ2ξ2t x−
1
2σ
2
2x
2t)dx∫
X
e−
x2
2 eκt(σ2ξ2t x−
1
2σ
2
2x
2r)dx
−
e−λ1S∗t
∫
X
e−
x2
2 e(σ1κtξ1t+λ1)x−(
1
2σ
2
1κtt)x2dx∫
X
e−
x2
2 e(σ1κtξ1t )x−(
1
2σ1j
2κtt)x2dx
= −
eλ2S
∗
t
∫
X
e−
x2
2 e(σ2κtξ2t−λ2)x−(
1
2σ
2
2κtt)x2dx∫
X
e−
x2
2 e(σ2κtξ2t )x−(
1
2σ
2
2κtt)x2dx
−e−λ1S∗t e
(σ1κtξ
1
t+λ1)
2
2(σ21κtt+1) e
− (σ1κtξ
1
t )
2
2(σ21κtt+1) = −eλ2S∗t e
(σ2κtξ
2
t−λ2)
2
2(σ22κtt+1) e
− (σ2κtξ
2
t )
2
2(σ22κtt+1)
−e−λ1S
∗
t+
1
2
λ21
σ21κtt+1
+σ1κtξ
1
t λ1
σ21κtt+1 = −eλ2S
∗
t+
1
2
λ22
σ22κtt+1
−σ2κtξ
2
t λ2
σ22κtt+1 , (71)
which directly implies, also by Eq. (68), that
S∗t =
λ1
(
σ1κtξ1t
σ21κtt+1
+ 12
λ1
σ21κtt+1
)
+ λ2
(
σ2κtξ2t
σ22κtt+1
− 12 λ2σ22κtt+1
)
λ1 + λ2
= λ1
λ1 + λ2
S1t +
λ2
λ1 + λ2
S2t . (72)
Thus, the information-based market price is the weighted average of
risk-adjusted signal-based prices with respect to the risk aversion levels λj .
Accordingly, ast and bst , and all relevant quantities such as P
j
t (ξjc |x+, s) will
need to be updated to re-explore an optimal strategy.
6 Conclusion
We’ve introduced a network of a pair of agents with heterogeneous signal
sources (or signal processing skills). The gap between the agents’ stepwise
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average P&Ls is shown to be directly linked to whether agents mutually learn
during trade. The case where agents are ‘attentive’, i.e., do learn from each
other, as compared to the case where they are ‘omitters,’ is associated with a
significant convergence of P&Ls. It is also apparent, from the analysis on the
impact of mutual learning on how quickly the true value of the fundamental
is discovered, that mutual learning works in favour of the agent with an
inferior signal, and it turns out to be a win-win situation when they have
similar informational skills.
Furthermore, the existence of a ‘common knowledge of gains from trade’
(in the sense of [6]) is found to be essential to an equilibrium, and to avoid
market shutdowns. We derive explicit formula for the ex ante P&L of the
agent before an auction takes place through quantifying the ex-ante direc-
tional quality of his trading signal and his expected P&L conditional on
whether the signal points is correct or erroneous. As expected, perception
of a greater informational superiority means a greater likelihood for the
agent that his trading signal is directionally correct and greater expected
profits. And, this likelihood is stronger in the case of an a priori greater
uncertainty (i.e., greater dispersion of the payoff’s prior density), and also
whenever the agent chooses to refrain from trade. In equilibrium, we find
that the optimal strategy is to exploit extra information as soon as it arrives,
as the cost of foregoing an expected profit is higher than the cost of sharing
the new information. This result not only agrees with most of the informed-
trading literature, but also establishes, in a soft sense, the rationale behind
high-frequency trading.
Finally, when agents are risk-averse, we are able to recover the risk-
premium as inversely proportional to the information flow rate, which allows
us to introduce the concept of ‘information-adjusted risk premium’. The
equilibrium price in this case is a nice convex combination of individual
signal-based prices with respect to individual levels of risk aversion.
As an outlook, we would like to extend the present analysis to cases
where there are multiple agents, the information flows are mimicked by a
more general class of Le´vy processes, possibly including jumps, and the
amount of information shared is a function of the amount traded.
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